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Abstract  
Distributional cost-effectiveness analysis (DCEA) is a framework for incorporating health inequality 
concerns into the economic evaluation of health sector interventions.  In this tutorial we describe 
the technical details of how to conduct DCEA, using an illustrative example comparing alternative 
ways of implementing the NHS Bowel Cancer Screening Programme (BCSP).  The two key stages in 
DCEA are (A) modelling social distributions of health associated with different interventions and (B) 
evaluating social distributions of health with respect to the dual objectives of improving total 
population health and reducing unfair health inequality.  As well as describing the technical methods 
used, we also identify the data requirements and the social value judgements that have to be made.  
Finally, we demonstrate the use of sensitivity analyses to explore the impacts of alternative 
modelling assumptions and social value judgements. 
 
Keywords 
Cost-effectiveness analysis, economic evaluation, efficiency, equality, equity, fairness, health 
distribution, health inequality, inequality measures, opportunity cost, social value judgements, social 
welfare functions, trade-off 
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1. Introduction 
When designing and prioritising preventive interventions, health care decision makers often have 
concerns about reducing unfair health inequality as well as improving total population health.  
However, the economic evaluation of such interventions is typically conducted using methods of 
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) which focus exclusively on maximising total population health.  
These standard methods of CEA do not provide decision makers with information about the health 
inequality impacts of the interventions evaluated, or the nature and size of any trade-offs between 
improving total population health and reducing unfair health inequality. 
 
To address these shortcomings we have developed a framework for incorporating health inequality 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚƐŝŶƚŽ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĐĂůů “ĚŝƐtributional cost-ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ? ? ?ŝƐƐƵŝƚĂďůĞ
for health sector decisions concerning the design and prioritisation of any type of health care 
intervention with an explicit health inequality reduction objective  ? potentially including treatments 
as well as preventive health care such as programmes of health promotion, screening, vaccination, 
case finding, primary and secondary prevention of chronic disease, and so on.  However, like 
standard CEA, it focuses exclusively on health benefits and opportunity costs falling on the health 
sector budget.  DCEA therefore does not provide a fully general framework of distributional 
economic evaluation for evaluating the health and income inequality impacts of cross-government 
public health programmes with important non-health benefits and opportunity costs falling outside 
the health sector budget. 
 
The DCEA framework has two main stages: (A) modelling social distributions of health associated 
with each intervention, and (B) evaluating social distributions of health.  The main steps in the 
modelling stage are: 
 
A1. estimating the baseline health distribution;  
 
A2.  modelling changes to this baseline distribution due to the health interventions being 
compared, allowing for the distribution of opportunity costs from additional resource 
use; 
 
A3. adjusting the resulting modelled health distributions for alternative social value 
judgements about fair and unfair sources of health variation;  
 
And the main steps in the evaluation stage are: 
 
B1.   using the estimated distributions to quantify the change in total population health and 
unfair health inequality due to each intervention; 
 
B2. ranking the interventions based on dominance criteria; and finally 
 
B3. analysing any trade-offs between improving population health and reducing unfair 
health inequality, allowing for alternative specifications of the underlying social welfare 
function. 
 
To demonstrate the DCEA framework we will use it to analyse four possible options for promoting 
increased uptake of the NHS Bowel Cancer Screening Programme (BCSP) in England.  The BSCP is a 
biennial self-test based screening programme targeted at 60-74 year olds that aims to detect and 
treat colorectal cancer (CRC) early, and has been shown to reduce CRC related mortality risk by a 
substantial proportion.  Individuals in the relevant age range are sent a guaiac faecal occult blood 
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test (gFOBT) kit in the mail and are expected to complete the test by collecting 3 stool samples over 
a period of a few days and post them back for laboratory analysis.  Those individuals testing positive 
are invited for further diagnostic testing (follow up colonoscopy) and, where appropriate, treatment.   
 
Analysis of the BCSP pilots and early data from the roll out of the BSCP have indicated large 
variations in uptake of the screening programme patterned by the social variables of area 
deprivation, sex and ethnicity.  This variation in uptake can be modelled through to estimate its 
impact on mortality and morbidity for the different socio-economic subgroups in the population, 
and hence to describe the impact of the screening programme on both the average level of health 
and on the social distribution of health in the population. 
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2. METHODS 
2.1 Stage A: Modelling Social Distributions of Health  
2.1.1 Estimating the baseline health distribution 
The first step in DCEA is to describe the baseline distribution of health, taking into account variation 
in both length and health related quality of life.  This baseline distribution will need to include the 
full general population, and not just the population of recipients of the intervention.  This is for two 
reasons.  First, the full general population is typically the relevant population for characterising 
policy concern with health inequality.  Second, within the context of a national, budget constrained 
system such as the NHS, additional resources used by recipients of an intervention will displace 
activities that could have been provided to anyone within the full general population.  
 
This baseline distribution of health should be able to describe variation in health among multiple 
different subgroups in the population as defined by relevant population characteristics, allowing for 
the correlation structure between these various characteristics.  The relevant population 
characteristics include not only dimensions of direct equity concern (e.g. income, ethnicity) but also 
characteristics necessary to estimate expected costs and effects and which may or may not generate 
further equity concern (e.g. sex).  The latter of these is standard for any CEA, while the former we 
discuss further throughout this tutorial.  The health metric we use in this context is quality adjusted 
life expectancy (QALE) at birth, though other suitable health metrics could also be used  ? such as 
disability adjusted life expectancy at birth or age-specific QALE  ? so long as they are measured on an 
interpersonally comparable ratio scale suitable for use within CEA. 
 
The population characteristics of interest in this case study  ? those by which a substantial variation 
in uptake of the BCSP was observed  ? are sex, area level deprivation and area level ethnic diversity.  
The first step in estimating our population QALE distribution is to estimate life expectancy (LE) 
according to each of these characteristics.  Area level deprivation in the BSCP evaluation studies was 
measured based on index of multiple deprivation (IMD 2004) quintiles, and area level ethnic 
diversity was based on the percentage of people in the area originating from the Indian 
Subcontinent, again split into quintiles (Weller, 2009). National statistics data are available by sex 
and deprivation level/social class but are not available by our particular measure of ethnic diversity.  
We therefore did not include correlations with ethnic diversity in our estimation of the baseline 
health distribution and instead, for the purposes of the analysis, assumed its distribution is 
independent of deprivation and sex. 
 
Data on LE by IMD quintile and sex is published directly by the Office of National Statistics (ONS, 
2013).  However, for the purposes of our analysis we also require the underlying mortality rates used 
to estimate these figures in order to incorporate them in the decision analytical model where all-
cause mortality is separated from colorectal cancer specific mortality.   Unfortunately, these 
underlying mortality rates are not available by IMD quintiles.  So to ensure we remain consistent 
between our baseline QALE distribution and QALE distributions associated with the various 
implementations of the BSCP produced by our model, we use ONS mortality rates by social class 
(ONS, 2007) to proxy those by IMD, and apply the mapping between social classes and IMD quintiles 
given in Table I.   
 
We then use these mapped mortality rates to calculate the LE at birth by IMD quintiles (2002-05) 
using the standard ONS methodology (Johnson & Blackwell, 2007).  Table II compares life 
expectancies estimated indirectly using the mapping process described above with published direct 
estimates of life expectancy by IMD quintile for the same period (2002-05).  We see from the 
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comparison that while the mapped values are on the whole reasonably close to the published 
values, they begin to diverge for the more deprived areas. 
 
Table I. Mapping between IMD quintiles and social class 
Deprivation (IMD 
Quintile) 
Social Class 
Q1 (Least Deprived) I&II (Professional occupations & Managerial and technical occupations) 
Q2 I&II (Professional occupations & Managerial and technical occupations) 
Q3 IIIN (Skilled non-manual occupations) 
Q4 IIIM (Skilled manual occupations) 
Q5 (Most Deprived) IV&V (Partly-skilled occupations & Unskilled Occupations) 
 
Table II. Comparison between mapped and published LE by IMD quintile 
Sex 
Deprivation (IMD 
Quintile) 
LE by Mapped IMD 
Quintiles (years) 
LE Published IMD 
Quintiles (years) 
Difference  
(Mapped  ? Published) 
Male Q1 (Least Deprived) 80.4 80.0 0.4 
 Q2 80.4 78.6 1.8 
 Q3 79.2 77.3 1.9 
 Q4 77.7 75.4 2.3 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 76.2 72.2 4.0 
Female Q1 (Least Deprived) 83.7 83.2 0.5 
 Q2 83.7 82.3 1.4 
 Q3 82.6 81.5 1.1 
 Q4 81.1 80.1 1.0 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 80.3 77.9 2.4 
 
We next adjust these life expectancies for morbidity.  To do this we adjust for age and sex by 
applying the relevant weights from the published EQ-5D Norms (Kind, Hardman, & Macran, 1999) 
for each age range (reproduced in Table III) and aggregate to give and age and sex adjusted QALE. 
Taking the example of a male in the least deprived IMD quintile group (Q1) we can read from Table II 
that their estimated life expectancy is 80.4 years.   Using the weights in Table III we estimate the 
QALE for individuals in this subgroup as: 
 
24*0.94 + (35-25)*0.93 + (45-35)*0.91 + (55-45)*0.84 + (65-55)*0.78 + (75-65)* 0.78 + (80.5-
75)*0.75 = 69.8  QALYs 
 
Table III. QALY weights by age and sex based on EQ-5D norms 
Age Male Female 
0-25 0.94 0.94 
25-34 0.93 0.93 
35-44 0.91 0.91 
45-54 0.84 0.85 
55-64 0.78 0.81 
65-74 0.78 0.78 
75+ 0.75 0.71 
 
In addition to quality adjusting LE for age and sex, we also would like to adjust for variation in quality 
of life by area level deprivation.  In order to do this we turn to the ONS data for LE and disability free 
life expectancy (DFLE) by IMD quintile (ONS, 2013).  We assume that the average quality adjustment 
we have applied by using the age and sex weights captures the adjustment for the middle IMD 
quintile group (Q3)for each sex, and calculate relative adjustment factors for the other IMD quintiles 
by further assuming the ratio of DFLE to LE is the same as the ratio of QALE to LE.  We use this data 
to calculate the adjustment factors shown in Table IV. 
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Table IV. Using LE and DFLE to calculate QALE adjustment factors by IMD 
Sex 
Deprivation (IMD 
Quintile) LE DFLE Ratio DFLE/LE 
QALE Adjustment 
Factor  
Male Q1 (Least Deprived) 80.0 67.3 0.84 1.03 
 Q2 78.6 64.3 0.82 1.00 
 Q3 77.3 63.4 0.82 1.00 
 Q4 75.4 59.7 0.79 0.96 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 72.2 54.2 0.75 0.91 
Female Q1 (Least Deprived) 83.2 67.8 0.81 1.02 
 Q2 82.3 65.7 0.80 1.00 
 Q3 81.5 64.9 0.80 1.00 
 Q4 80.1 61.8 0.77 0.97 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 77.9 57.2 0.73 0.92 
 
Applying the adjustment factor to our QALE estimate for our male from IMD Q1 gives a refined QALE 
estimate taking into account area level deprivation of:  
 
69.8 * 1.03 = 72 QALYs  
 
Similar calculations for the other subgroups yield the QALE estimates in Table V. 
 
Table V. QALE by sex and deprivation 
Sex Deprivation (IMD Quintile) QALE 
Male Q1 (Least Deprived) 72.2 
 Q2 70.5 
 Q3 69.1 
 Q4 66.6 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 60.2 
Female Q1 (Least Deprived) 74.8 
 Q2 73.1 
 Q3 71.8 
 Q4 69.2 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 63.2 
 
Ordering the subgroups by QALE from least healthy to most healthy and adjusting for the size of 
each subgroup we are able to create a population distribution of QALE at birth taking into account 
differential mortality and morbidity by age, sex and area level deprivation.  A summary of this QALE 
distribution by health quintile is shown in Figure 1.  This forms the baseline health distribution that 
we will use in our analysis.  
 
 
Figure 1: Baseline health distribution 
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2.1.2  Estimating the distribution of health changes due to the interventions 
In order to evaluate changes in the baseline health distribution that could be attributed to the use of 
alternative interventions, it is necessary to know how the costs and effects of the intervention differ 
between the relevant subgroups, and how the opportunity costs of any change in resource use differ 
by those same subgroups. 
 
Having estimated a baseline health distribution we next turn to modelling how this health 
distribution is impacted by the BSCP and alternative ways of promoting increased uptake of the 
BSCP.  We do this using an existing cost effectiveness model of the BSCP that simulates the natural 
history of CRC and the impact of screening and treatment on this natural history (Whyte & Stevens, 
2011; Tappenden et al., 2007).  We adapt the model to look at the distributional health impacts of 
four different screening strategies: 
 
I.  “EŽ^ĐƌĞĞŶŝŶŐ ? PƚŚĞďĂƐĞůŝŶĞƐŽĐŝĂůĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨŚĞĂůƚŚ 
II.  “^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ^ĐƌĞĞŶŝŶŐ ?ĂƐŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ^W 
III.  “dĂƌŐĞƚĞĚƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌ ? P^ĐƌĞĞŶŝng plus a targeted enhanced reminder letter (personal GP 
signed letter and tailored information package) sent only to those living in the most 
income deprived small areas (IMD4 and IMD5) as well as to those living in areas with 
the highest proportion of inhabitants from the Indian Subcontinent (IS5).  
IV.  “hŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌ ? P^ĐƌĞĞŶŝŶŐƉůƵƐĂƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůďĂƐŝĐƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌůĞƚƚĞƌ ?ƐĞŶĚŝŶŐĂ'W
endorsed reminder letter to all eligible patients).  
 
Impacts are first estimated by subgroup and then combined to evaluate the impact of the screening 
strategies on the overall social distribution of health.   
 
There are a number of parameters in the model that can vary by subgroup, including: 
 
1. Disease prevalence, severity, mortality rate and natural history - we assume in our case 
study that bowel cancer specific parameters are constant across our population 
subgroups.  The evidence available (National Cancer Intelligence Network, 2004) 
broadly supports this assumption, though more detailed data at the subgroup level 
would be required to validate this assumption. 
2. Uptake of the intervention  ? the impact of gFOBT uptake by subgroup is the key 
difference between the various implementations of the screening programme. We 
discuss in detail below how this parameter is estimated for each subgroup. We also 
estimate the uptake of follow up colonoscopy by subgroup for those people that are 
invited back for further investigation after being screened. 
3. Direct costs associated with the intervention - we assume the direct costs related to 
treating a given stage of bowel cancer do not vary by subgroup (though the chance of 
incurring these costs and the screening related costs by subgroup may vary under the 
different implementations of the screening programme).  This seems to be a plausible 
assumption in the absence of more detailed cost data at the subgroup level.   
4. Opportunity costs from displaced activities - Opportunity costs are in the base case 
analysis assumed to be shared equally among all population subgroups, this assumption 
is explored in sensitivity analyses discussed later in this tutorial. 
5. Other cause mortality  ? we use the mortality rates by subgroup in the same way as 
discussed when deriving the baseline health distribution.  In calculating these rates we 
remove bowel cancer specific mortality assuming this is constant across subgroups and 
apply this separately in the model. 
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Quality adjustment of health gains to reflect morbidity  ? we apply the subgroup specific adjustments 
to quality adjust health gains resulting from the screening programme in a similar manner to that 
which they were applied to estimate the baseline health distribution. The population QALE 
distribution under no screening corresponds to our baseline health distribution as calculated in the 
previous section.  In our analysis of the BSCP we include an additional variable  ? area level 
proportion of population from the Indian Subcontinent (IS)  ? which we were unable to incorporate 
into our estimation of the baseline health distribution.  We assume that this IS variable is distributed 
independently of IMD and sex, and that it has no independent effect on baseline QALE i.e. subgroups 
are adjusted for other cause mortality and quality adjusted only according to their IMD and sex and 
these adjustments are not effected by their IS.  We next adjust the BSCP uptake parameters by 
subgroup.  Table VI shows logistic regression results looking at gFOBT uptake in the three rounds of 
the BCSP pilot (Weller, 2009).  We use this data in combination with the proportion of invitees in 
each category by variable, also reported in the pilot evaluation, to get weighted average odds ratios 
(OR) for uptake that can be applied in the model. 
 
Table VI. Regression results of gFOBT uptake from evaluation of BCSP pilot 
  Adjusted OR 
(95% CI) 
Age (years) 57-59 1 
 
 60-64 1.13 
(1.11  ? 1.16) 
 65-69 1.25 
(1.22  ? 1.28) 
Sex Male 1 
 Female 1.38 
(1.35  ? 1.40) 
Pilot Round 1 1 
 
 2 0.77 
(0.76  ? 0.80) 
 3 0.82 
(0.81  ? 0.84) 
Deprivation Category 
(IMD) 
Q1 (Least Deprived) 1 
 
 Q2 0.84 
(0.81 -0.87) 
 Q3 0.70 
(0.68  ? 0.72) 
 Q4 0.55 
(0.54  ? 0.57) 
 Q5 (Most Deprived) 0.37 
(0.35  ? 0.38) 
% Indian Subcontinent Q1-4 1 
 
 Q5 (Highest %) 0.86 
(0.84  ? 0.89) 
 
These odds ratios are applied to a baseline rate of uptake reported in the third round pilot where 
males in the youngest age group, living in the most deprived areas with the highest proportion of 
people from the Indian subcontinent had an uptake probability of 34%.  For example, to calculate 
the uptake probability for a woman of any age across all rounds of the pilot, living in the least 
deprived areas and with the least numbers of people from the Indian Subcontinent, we can use the 
following calculation. 
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OR = 0.34/(1-0.34) * (1.38 /0.82) * 1.13 * 0.86 * (1/0.37) * (1/0.86) = 2.71 
 
P = OR/(1+OR) = 0.73 
 
A similar regression analysis was reported analysing the effect of these same variables on the uptake 
of follow up colonoscopy.  Data were also published in the pilot study evaluation regarding the 
numbers of people in each category for each variable in the study.  However, cross-tabulations or 
correlations between the variables were not available and we therefore assumed that each variable 
was independently distributed to calculate the proportion of the population in each subgroup.  Table 
VII shows our calculated gFOBT uptake, follow up colonoscopy uptake, and the proportion of the 
population by each subgroup. 
Table VII. gFOBT uptake, follow up colonoscopy uptake and proportion of population by subgroup 
Sex % Indian Sub-
Continent (IS) 
Deprivation (IMD 
Quintile) 
gFOBT 
Uptake 
(%) 
Colonoscopy 
Uptake (%) 
Population 
Proportion 
(%) 
Male Q1-4 Q1 (Least Deprived) 66 86 6 
  Q2 62 84 9 
  Q3 58 80 10 
  Q4 52 79 8 
  Q5 (Most Deprived) 42 77 6 
 Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least Deprived) 63 87 1 
  Q2 59 85 2 
  Q3 54 81 3 
  Q4 48 79 2 
  Q5 (Most Deprived) 38 75 2 
Female Q1-4 Q1 (Least Deprived) 73 85 6 
  Q2 70 83 9 
  Q3 66 79 10 
  Q4 60 77 8 
  Q5 (Most Deprived) 50 76 6 
 Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least Deprived) 70 86 1 
  Q2 66 83 2 
  Q3 62 79 3 
  Q4 56 78 2 
  Q5 (Most Deprived) 46 76 2 
 
Using these parameters in the model provides the total costs and health gains due to the BSCP 
under the standard screening approach.   
 
We next turn to modelling the remaining two implementations of the screening programme.  Both 
implementations augment the standard screening programme with additional reminders.  We derive 
indicative estimates of costs and impacts on screening uptake of these reminder strategies from 
similar interventions studied in the screening literature (Shankaran et al., 2007; Hewitson et al., 
2011), applying plausible exchange rates and inflation rates to the figures to get costs and assuming 
all subgroups receiving the interventions have equal additive increases in uptake.  The values used in 
the model for costs and impacts on gFOBT uptake for each of the strategies are given in Table VIII. 
 
Table VIII. Costs and impact on gFOBT uptake of reminder strategies 
Strategy Cost per recipient Increase in gFOBT uptake per recipient 
Universal 
reminder 
Targeted 
£3.50 6% 
reminder £7.00 12% 
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In order to estimate total costs and health effects the model is evaluated for a representative cohort 
of the population  ? in our case a cohort of 1 million 30 year olds, as was used in the original analysis 
of the BSCP in the model we inherited.  The size of each subgroup is given by the population 
proportions calculated in Table VII.  We sum the costs across all subgroups, and convert these to 
health opportunity costs using a threshold value of £20,000 per QALY.  These health opportunity 
costs are then apportioned equally to each individual in the population allowing the model to 
characterise net health gains in each subgroup.  For example, the total costs for the standard 
screening programme over the lifetime of the cohort of 1 million patients came to £72 million.  
Converting this to health opportunity costs at the rate of £20,000 per QALY gives us 3,600 QALYs of 
health opportunity costs.  Women who live in areas with a low percentage of the population from 
the Indian Subcontinent (IS Q1-4), and which also fall within deprivation quintile IMD Q3, make up 
10% of the population.  So we allocate 10% of this total health opportunity cost to them i.e. 360 
QALYs.  This is then subtracted from the total health gains due to the BCSP in this subgroup to give 
the net health effect of the BCSP on this subgroup.   
 
The assumption of equally distributed opportunity cost is convenient, but not evidence based.  So 
we explore alternative assumptions in sensitivity analysis, focusing on two extreme cases where all 
opportunity costs are allocated to the least healthy and the healthiest subgroups, respectively. 
 
Table IX. QALE distribution by subgroup under each strategy 
   QALE 
Sex % Indian 
Sub-
Continent 
(IS) 
Deprivation (IMD 
Quintile) 
Baseline Standard Targeted Universal 
Male Q1-4 Q1 (Least Deprived) 72.16 72.21 72.20 72.21 
  Q2 70.48 70.52 70.52 70.52 
  Q3 69.09 69.12 69.12 69.13 
  Q4 66.61 66.63 66.63 66.63 
  Q5 (Most Deprived) 60.22 60.24 60.24 60.24 
 Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least Deprived) 72.16 72.20 72.21 72.21 
  Q2 70.48 70.52 70.52 70.52 
  Q3 69.09 69.12 69.13 69.12 
  Q4 66.61 66.63 66.63 66.63 
  Q5 (Most Deprived) 60.22 60.23 60.24 60.23 
Female Q1-4 Q1 (Least Deprived) 74.84 74.91 74.91 74.92 
  Q2 73.10 73.16 73.16 73.17 
  Q3 71.77 71.82 71.81 71.82 
  Q4 69.19 69.23 69.24 69.23 
  Q5 (Most Deprived) 63.17 63.20 63.20 63.20 
 Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least Deprived) 74.84 74.91 74.92 74.91 
  Q2 73.10 73.16 73.17 73.16 
  Q3 71.77 71.81 71.82 71.82 
  Q4 69.19 69.23 69.24 69.23 
  Q5 (Most Deprived) 63.17 63.20 63.20 63.20 
Overall 
Average 
  
69.260 69.300 69.301 69.302 
 
The additional parameters that we have added to the model are assigned standard distributions by 
variable type, and their mean and standard error values are used to generate suitable random draws 
for these variables in the probabilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA).  Details of how these additional 
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variables are dealt with in the PSA are given in Table X.  All the results presented are produced by 
running the model probabilistically and averaging over 1000 iterations of the model.  
 
The resulting health distributions estimated for each screening implementation are described below.  
Figure 2a shows the gFOBT uptake by health quintile for each strategy and Figure 2b shows the 
colonoscopy uptake by health quintile.  QALE for each subgroup calculated from our adjusted model 
is given in Table IX and these are presented for our cohort by health quintile in Figure 3a and Figure 
3b allowing us to better appreciate the relative impacts of the strategies.   
Figure 2a: gFOBT uptake distribution by strategy Figure 2b: colonoscopy uptake distribution 
 
 
Figure 3a: Health compared to no screening  (per 
million of population invited for screened) 
Figure 3b: Health compared to standard screening 
(per million of population invited for screening) 
 
Table X. Distributions and parameter values used in PSA for additional parameters added to model 
Parameter Explanation 
gFOBT and colonoscopy 
uptake 
Uncertainty on these calculated in PSA assuming ln(OR) distributed 
normally. The variance covariance matrices for the uptake regressions were 
not available to us so we drew each coefficient independently and 
combined to create uptake probabilities. 
Mortality rates Adjusted for uncertainty by the underlying model. 
Quality adjustment  Used beta distribution with the mean and standard error values as reported 
in the UK EQ-5D norms. 
Cost of reminders As no data was given on the uncertainty we assume a 10% standard error 
and used this to draw values from the appropriate gamma distributions. 
Impact of reminders on 
uptake 
Reported mean and standard errors values used to draw from the 
appropriate beta distributions. 
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2.1.3  Adjusting for social value judgements about fair and unfair sources of inequality 
The distributions of health estimated thus far represent all variation in health in the population.  
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐŽŵĞǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚŵĂǇďĞĚĞĞŵĞĚ “ĨĂŝƌ ?Žƌ ?ĂƚůĞĂƐƚ “ŶŽƚƵŶĨĂŝƌ ? ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚ
is due to individual choice or unavoidable bad luck.  In such cases the health distributions should first 
ďĞ ĂĚũƵƐƚĞĚ ƚŽ ŽŶůǇ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ĚĞĞŵĞĚ  “ƵŶĨĂŝƌ ? ďĞĨŽƌĞ ŵĞĂƐƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ
inequality.  Social value judgements need to be made about whether or not health variation 
associated with each of the population characteristics is deemed fair.  In our example we have three 
variables to consider: sex, IMD and ethnicity.  We might make the value judgement that differences 
in health due to sex are fair, while differences in health due to IMD and ethnicity are unfair  ? this is 
one of eight possible value judgements that we can make on fairness in this example.  One way of 
adjusting our modelled health distributions for this value judgement is by using direct 
standardisation (Fleurbaey & Schokkaert, 2009).  To do this we run a regression on our QALE 
distribution weighting the subgroups by the proportion of the population they represent to find the 
association between each variable and QALE.  An example of such a regression is given in Table XI.  
We then use reference values for those variables deemed fair (i.e. sex in this case) while leaving the 
other variables to take the values they have in the relevant subgroups and predict out an adjusted 
QALE distribution.  In this example we use male as the reference value for sex and predict out the 
QALE distribution as shown in Table XII.  This distribution represents only the variation in health 
deemed unfair by the social value judgement made.  Reference values used in the adjustment 
process are typically population averages for continuous variables while for categorical variables the 
most commonly occurring category is typically used with sensitivity analysis performed on the 
impact of alternative choices of reference category. 
 
Table XI. Fairness adjustment regression 
 Coefficient 
(SE) 
Constant 
74.92 
(4.37E-05) 
IS Q1-4  
-0.004 
(2.56E-05) 
Male 
-2.708 
(5.47E-05) 
IMD Q2 
-1.75 
(4.91E-05) 
IMD Q3 
-3.097 
(4.84E-05) 
IMD Q4 
-5.675 
(5.02E-05) 
IMD Q5 
-11.71 
(5.33E-05) 
Male*IMD Q2 
0.065 
(6.95E-05) 
Male*IMD Q3 
0.015 
(6.84E-05) 
Male*IMD Q4 
0.104 
(7.10E-05) 
Male*IMD Q5 
-0.259 
(7.532E-05) 
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Table XII. Fairness adjusted health distribution reference sex = male 
   QALE 
Sex % Indian Sub-
Continent (IS) 
Deprivation (IMD 
Quintile) Targeted 
Targeted 
Adjusted 
Male Q1-4 Q1 (Least 
Deprived) 
72.20 72.20 
  Q2 70.52 70.52 
  Q3 69.12 69.12 
  Q4 66.63 66.63 
  Q5 (Most 
Deprived) 
60.24 60.24 
 Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least 
Deprived) 
72.21 72.21 
  Q2 70.52 70.52 
  Q3 69.13 69.13 
  Q4 66.63 66.63 
  Q5 (Most 
Deprived) 
60.24 60.24 
Female Q1-4 Q1 (Least 
Deprived) 
74.91 72.20 
  Q2 73.16 70.52 
  Q3 71.81 69.12 
  Q4 69.24 66.63 
  Q5 (Most 
Deprived) 
63.20 60.24 
 Q5 (Highest) Q1 (Least 
Deprived) 
74.92 72.21 
  Q2 73.17 70.52 
  Q3 71.82 69.13 
  Q4 69.24 66.63 
  Q5 (Most 
Deprived) 
63.20 60.24 
 
2.2 Stage B: Evaluating Social Distributions of Health 
2.2.1 Comparing interventions in terms of total health and unfair health inequality 
Once we have estimated the appropriate health distributions we can then go on to characterise the 
distributions in terms of the twin policy goals of improving total health and reducing health 
inequality.  One useful piece of information for decision makers produced at this step of the analysis 
is the size of the health opportunity cost of choosing an intervention that reduces health inequality  ? 
this is simply the difference in total health between the intervention and a comparator.  However, 
this step of the analysis can also go further than that by providing information about the size of the 
reduction in health inequality, in terms of the difference in one or more suitable inequality indices 
between the intervention and a comparator.  The selection of appropriate inequality indices requires 
further value judgements about the nature of the inequality concern.  There are a number of 
commonly used indices to measure inequality that can be broadly grouped into those measuring 
relative inequality (scale invariant indices), those measuring absolute inequality (translation 
invariant) and those measuring health poverty or shortfall from a reference value.  If there is no 
clear choice of inequality measure it may be preferable to calculate a range of alternative measures. 
Table XIII shows the results of calculating a range of relative and absolute inequality measures for 
the QALE distributions associated with our four screening strategies.  A higher value for each 
measure indicates a higher level of inequality between the most healthy and the least healthy.   
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Table XIII. Inequality measures calculated for four screening strategies 
Relative Inequality Indices no screening standard 
targeted 
reminder 
universal 
reminder 
 Relative Gap Index (ratio)  0.17527* 0.17592 0.17586 0.17596 
 Relative Index of Inequality (RII)  0.18607* 0.18674 0.18668 0.18678 
 Gini Index  0.03101* 0.03112 0.03111 0.03113 
 ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ/ŶĚĞǆ ?ɸA? ? ? 0.00171* 0.00172 0.00172 0.00172 
 ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ/ŶĚĞǆ ?ɸA? ? ? 0.01330* 0.01337 0.01337 0.01338 
 ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ/ŶĚĞǆ ?ɸA? ? ? ? 0.06253* 0.06281 0.06279 0.06283 
 
Absolute Inequality Indices no screening standard 
targeted 
reminder 
universal 
reminder 
 Absolute Gap Index (range)  10.98604* 11.03064 11.02726 11.03325 
 Slope index of inequality (SII)  12.88747* 12.94123 12.93691 12.94438 
 <Žůŵ/ŶĚĞǆ ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.20281* 0.20430 0.20416 0.20439 
 <Žůŵ/ŶĚĞǆ ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? 0.87801* 0.88429 0.88371 0.88467 
 <Žůŵ/ŶĚĞǆ ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? 4.56391* 4.58739 4.58587 4.58883 
* indicates the most equal strategy 
ɸA? ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐůŽǁƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶǁŚŝůĞɸA? ? ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐŚŝŐŚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ 
ɲA? ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐůŽǁĂďƐŽůƵƚĞŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶǁŚŝůĞɲA? ? ? ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐŚŝŐŚĂďƐŽůƵƚĞŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ 
 
2.2.2  Ranking interventions using dominance rules 
The first step in comparing distributions is looking to commonly used distributional dominance rules, 
as these allow strategies to be ranked with minimal restriction to the form of the underlying social 
welfare function. In terms of standard economic dominance rules we can note from Table IX that no-
screening and standard screening are strictly dominated in the space of QALE by the universal 
reminder strategy  ? that is, no sex-IMD-ethnicity subgroup is less healthy and at least one subgroup 
is healthier.  However, this rule does not account for the level of inequality.  When ranking 
distributions based on mean health and the level of health inequality, it is possible to use alternative 
economic dominance rules provided by Atkinson (Atkinson, 1970) and Shorrocks (Shorrocks, 1983).  
These dominance rules apply when mean health is higher and inequality is lower for almost any 
measure of inequality.  Both rules are based around the Lorenz curve (Lorenz, 1905), a tool to 
analyse relative inequality constructed for health distributions by ordering the population from least 
healthy to most healthy and plotting the cumulative proportion of population health against the 
ĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌĞŵƚĞƐƚƐĨŽƌ>ŽƌĞŶǌĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
distributions; this means that the Lorenz curves for the distributions do not cross and the more 
equal distribution has at least as much mean health as the less equal distribution.  In other words, a 
distribution is dominated if it has higher inequality and the same or lower amount of mean health.  
On these criteria the standard screening strategy is dominated by the targeteĚƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌ ?^ŚŽƌƌŽĐŬƐ ?
theorem tests for generalised Lorenz dominance, wherein the Lorenz curve is multiplied by the 
mean health. A distribution is dominated if the generalised Lorenz curve lies wholly below that of an 
alternative intervention.  Under this criterion, both the targeted and universal reminder strategies 
dominate the no screening option.  This leaves us to compare the universal reminder and targeted 
reminder strategies.  While the universal reminder produces a higher average QALE overall and 
benefits the less deprived quintiles more, the targeted reminder is the more equal strategy on every 
measure listed in Table XIII and benefits the most deprived quintiles more.  In our example, the 
generalised Lorenz curves for these two distributions crosƐ ĂŶĚ ŚĞŶĐĞ ǁĞ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ƵƐĞ ^ŚŽƌƌŽĐŬƐ ?
theorem to rank the distributions.  
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2.2.3  Analysing trade-offs between total health and health inequality using social welfare 
indices 
Having used distributional dominance to eliminate no screening and standard screening, in order to 
rank the remaining two strategies it is necessary more fully to specify an underlying social welfare 
function.  A number of alternative social welfare indices have been proposed that could be used to 
characterise the dual objectives of increasing total health and reducing health inequality.  A common 
feature of such functions is the need to specify the nature of and level (or value) of inequality 
aversion.  The inequality aversion parameters in these functions describe the trade-off between 
total health and the level of health inequality, i.e. the amount of total health that a decision maker 
would be willing to sacrifice in order to achieve a more equal distribution.  An intuitive way to depict 
this trade-off is to calculate for any social welfare function the equally distributed equivalent health 
(EDE) and compare this to the mean health offered by the distribution. 
In this example we will use two social welfare indices closely linked to the dominance rules applied 
above: the Atkinson index (Atkinson, 1970) to evaluate the distributions in terms of relative 
inequality and the Kolm index (Kolm, 1976) to evaluate the distributions in terms of absolute 
inequality.  The EDE for these social welfare indices can be calculated as follows using the inequality 
aversion parameters ࠱ ĂŶĚɲƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ P 
 
Atkinson Social Welfare Index: Kolm Social Welfare Index: ݄௘ௗ௘ ൌ  ൥ ?݊ ෍ሾ݄௜ሿଵିఌ௡௜ୀଵ ൩
ଵଵିఌ
 
݄௘ௗ௘ ൌ െ ൬ ?ߙ൰ ݈݋݃ ൭ ?݊ ෍ ݁ିఈ௛೔௡௜ୀଵ ൱ 
 
Figure 4a and Figure 4b show the difference in EDE health between the two strategies across 
different levels of inequality aversion for the relative and absolute social welfare indices 
respectively.  With zero inequality aversion the EDE represents the mean health, and we see that the 
universal strategy offer 1000 more population QALYs compared to the targeted strategy.  For 
inequality aversion levels greater than ࠱ A? ?ĂŶĚɲA? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇǁŽƵůĚďĞƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ?
implying that the decision maker would be willing to sacrifice those 1000 population QALYs in order 
to achieve the lower level of inequality. 
 
 Figure 4a: Sensitivity to level of relative inequality 
aversion 
 Figure 4b: Sensitivity to level of absolute inequality 
aversion 
 
2.3 Sensitivity analysis 
There are a number of sensitivity analyses we can run to explore the impact of making alternative 
assumptions in our modelling on our choice of preferred strategy.  Tables XIV and XV present the 
results, respectively, of exploring (1) the impacts of alternative assumptions around the distribution 
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of opportunity costs, and (2) the impacts of alternative social value judgements about which 
inequalities are considered unfair. 
 
Table XIV. Sensitivity to alternative opportunity cost distributions 
 
All opportunity cost borne by  
least healthy subgroup 
 All opportunity cost borne 
by healthiest subgroup 
Social Welfare 
Indices 
no 
screening 
standard 
targeted 
reminder 
universal 
reminder 
 targeted 
reminder 
universal 
reminder 
 Mean Health  69.25969 69.30006 69.30127 69.30233*  69.30127 69.30233* 
 Atkinson EDE 
 ?ɸA? ? ? 69.14152 69.18056 69.18147 69.18252*  69.18286 69.18373* 
 Atkinson EDE 
 ?ɸA? ? ? 68.33888 68.36800* 68.36610 68.36734  68.37799* 68.37769 
 Atkinson EDE 
 ?ɸA? ? ? ? 64.92865* 64.91468 64.89302 64.89892  64.95627* 64.95350 
 Kolm EDE 
 ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? ? ? 69.05688 69.09486 69.09556 69.09660*  69.09793 69.09866* 
 <Žůŵ ?ɲA? ? ? ? ?68.38168 68.41112* 68.40958 68.41074  68.42046* 68.42020 
 <Žůŵ ?ɲA? ? ? ? ?64.69578* 64.68086 64.65951 64.66532  64.72148* 64.71879 
* indicates the strategy yielding the highest social welfare 
 
Table XV. Sensitivity to alternative social value judgements 
Social Value Judgment Preferred Strategy based on Social Welfare Index 
IMD 
Ethnic 
Diversity Sex 
Atkinson 
 ?ɸс ? ? 
Atkinson 
 ?ɸс ? ? 
Atkinson 
EDE 
 ?ɸс ? ? ? 
Kolm EDE 
 ?ɲс ? ? ? ? ? ?
Kolm EDE 
 ?ɲс ? ? ? ? 
Kolm EDE 
 ?ɲс ? ? ? ? 
Fair Fair Fair U U U U U U 
Fair Unfair Fair U U U U U U 
Fair Fair Unfair U U U U U U 
Fair Unfair Unfair U U U U U U 
Unfair Fair Fair U U T U U T 
Unfair Unfair Fair U U T U U T 
Unfair Fair Unfair U U T U U T 
Unfair Unfair Unfair U U T U U T 
U = universal reminder, T = targeted reminder 
 
We could also perform additional sensitivity analyses including exploring alternative ways that the 
reminder strategies might affect the different population subgroups e.g. having constant 
proportional effects rather than constant absolute effects and testing for alternative underlying 
distributions of CRC mortality, incidence and severity.  
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3. Conclusion 
DCEA is a framework for incorporating health inequality concerns into the cost-effectiveness analysis 
of health care interventions.  It aims to help cost effectiveness analysts provide decision makers with 
useful quantitative information about the health inequality impacts of health care interventions, and 
the nature and size of trade-offs between the dual objectives of improving total health and reducing 
health inequality.  It also aims to help cost effectiveness analysts accommodate different value 
judgements about health inequality made by different decision makers and stakeholders. 
 
Social value judgements about health inequality are complex, context-dependent and contestable.  
For this reason, DCEA does not prescribe in advance any particular set of social value judgements 
about health inequality.  A number of social value judgements need to be made when implementing 
the DCEA framework, in particular regarding which dimensions of inequality are deemed unfair and 
the nature and strength of inequality aversion.  The framework makes these social value judgements 
explicit and transparent, and lends itself well to checking the sensitivity of conclusions based upon 
alternative plausible social value judgements.  DCEA thus aims to provide decision makers with 
useful quantitative information about health inequality impacts that can help to inform a 
deliberative decision making process, by showing how different social value judgements might or 
might not lead to different conclusions. 
 
DCEA is intended to be a general and flexible analytical framework that allows a diverse range of 
specific methods and techniques to be applied at different stages of the analysis.  In particular, the 
evaluation stage can in principle employ any kind of equity weighting and/or multi-criteria decision 
analysis to analyse trade-offs between improving total health and reducing health inequality, and is 
not restricted to application of the specific Atkinson and Kolm social welfare functions described in 
this tutorial. 
 
We have seen in this tutorial that DCEA is demanding in terms of data, but feasible to implement in a 
real world context through creative application of the standard tools of economic analysis.  The data 
and methods we have used are inevitably partial and crude in many respects, and it is our hope that 
the underpinning data and technical methods will be improved and refined over the years.   
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